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Why do auditors fail? What might work?
What won’t?†
JOHN C. COFFEE*
Adolf A. Berle Professor of Law, Columbia University Law School, New York, NY, USA
Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including
the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market
Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors
providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the
conﬂicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already
in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns.
Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their
managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and
perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service
and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would
respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by
reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced
personnel.
What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are
hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to
reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more
accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some
degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation.
Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and
remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’
of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory
grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to
propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist
shareholders and diversiﬁed shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it
under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are
likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.
Keywords: auditor; auditor independence; consulting/auditing balance; gatekeeper; Kingman
Review; shareholder activism
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Introduction

2018 has seen scandal after scandal rack the auditing profession on both sides of the Atlantic.1 In
the U.K., the Carillion debacle has prompted a House of Commons report characterizing the Big
Four as a ‘cozy club incapable of providing the degree of independent challenge needed,’2 and the
Financial Reporting Council (‘FRC’) has ﬁned KPMG LLP (‘KPMG’) and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (‘PwC’) for poor audit work and censured KPMG’s poor audit quality (See Collinson
2018, Kapoor 2018). In the U.S., several KPMG executives have been indicted for allegedly
bribing ofﬁcials at the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (‘PCAOB’) to obtain conﬁdential information about impending inspections by the PCAOB (and one has recently plead
guilty).3 Also in the U.S., the Department of Justice has recently opened a criminal investigation
of General Electric’s accounting (which for over 109 years has been audited by KPMG).4 On the
civil side, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (‘FDIC’) successfully sued PwC for its
failure to detect $2.3 billion in fraud at Colonial Bank, an Alabama bank that failed after the
2008 crisis, and the trial court this year awarded $625.3 million in damages against PwC (See
Yacik 2018). Elsewhere, major scandals in South Africa and Denmark have badly tarnished
the reputations of the Big Four in those countries.5 None of the Big Four have escaped involvement in these still developing scandals.
More importantly, at least in the U.K., the current crisis has gone beyond criticism of auditors
and the integrity of the audit process. Regulators are now also in the crosshairs. Momentum seems
to be developing in the U.K. for potentially major structural reforms, with some political leaders
and prominent editorialists calling for ‘breaking up the Big Four.’ Most notably, the U.K. Government has commissioned a study of the adequacy of audit regulation in the U.K. (known as
the ‘Kingman Review’ because it was authored by Sir John Kingman), which has recommended
that the FRC be replaced by a new audit regulator that would be established by legislation and
empowered to tax licensed auditors for its costs and expenses.6 Simultaneously, the U.K.’s Competition and Markets Authority (‘CMA’) launched an investigation in October 2018 into whether
the audit sector was competitive and sufﬁciently resilient to maintain high audit quality standards,
and it also reported on the same date that the Kingman Review issued its ﬁndings, again also
recommending sweeping changes.7
In contrast to this urgency in the U.K., the U.S. is still living in the era of Trump, and deregulation continues to be pursued. Although the scandals seem to be evenly distributed between the
U.S. and the U.K., the intensity of the reaction has been entirely different.
Why is there this disparity in attitudes? Clearly, the U.K. public wants retribution (and politicians tend to give the public what it wants). Beyond this, however, the looming shadow of Brexit
may also have made many in the U.K. nervous that it could risk its status as a ﬁnancial superpower if it does not tighten controls. Not only is the U.S. not facing the challenge of Brexit,
but in the U.S. a litigation system exists that can deal punitively with auditors who underperform.
If auditors misbehave in the U.S., they may be disciplined by a very zealous and entrepreneurial
plaintiff’s bar, which can (and does) bring securities class actions that result in multi-billion dollar
settlements.
In short, in the U.S., private enforcement supplements public enforcement, thus producing (at
least in theory) more deterrence. To give but two examples from 2018: Plaintiff’s attorneys convinced a U.S. federal court to order PwC to pay the FDIC $625.3 million in damages as a result of
its failure to detect fraud in the earlier noted Alabama bank failure (See Yacik 2018), and a federal
securities class action in New York resulted in Petrobras agreeing to a $3 billion dollar settlement
to which PwC contributed an additional $50 million (simply as the price of escaping an appeal by
the plaintiffs in a case that had been dismissed against PwC).8 In the U.S., the ﬁnancial penalties
and damages likely to be imposed by both public and private enforcement when a scandal
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surfaces will typically exceed those in the U.K. – frequently by an order of magnitude.9 Whether
or not adequate deterrence actually results from private enforcement in the U.S., the greater size of
the penalties in the U.S. stand out strikingly. Thus, precisely because the U.K. (and probably
Europe as well) seem unable or unwilling to adopt U.S. style enforcement, they must ﬁnd
some other means of ensuring accountability.
Despite these differences (with greater political anger in the U.K. and tougher enforcement in
the U.S.), the underlying problems appear to be much the same. On both sides of the Atlantic (and
in Europe and elsewhere as well), the basic model of the auditor has long been that the auditor is a
gatekeeper who pledges its reputational capital, acquired over many decades and a multitude of
clients, to assure investors as to the reliability of the issuer’s ﬁnancial statements.10 The premise
here is that a rational auditor will not risk its reputational capital simply to gain an enhanced fee
from a single client.
Here, some elaboration is needed. By ‘gatekeeper,’ one can mean just someone who controls
access to the ‘gate’ – that is, someone with veto power who can thus perform a policing function.
But the contemporary problem with gatekeepers involves a broader conception of that term. In
this broader view, a ‘gatekeeper’ is a repeat player who provides certiﬁcation or veriﬁcation services to investors, vouching for someone (such as a corporate issuer) who has a greater incentive
to deceive. In this view, auditors, securities analysts, credit rating agencies and others are all
agents of the investor who act as reputational intermediaries to assure investors as to the
quality of the ‘signal’ sent by a corporate issuer. The reputational intermediary does so by ‘pledging’ its reputational capital to the corporate issuer, thus enabling investors (or the market) to rely
on the corporate issuer’s representations and disclosures (where in the absence of such a pledge
they might not). At least in the U.S., respected judges have endorsed this model, opining that it
would be simply ‘irrational’ for a major auditing ﬁrm to tolerate fraud because the auditing ﬁrm
would suffer a reputational loss (and hence reduced future earnings) that dwarfed its audit fee
from the responsible issuer.11 Still, such ‘irrationality’ appears increasingly common today.
What explains this? At this point, we encounter a basic disconnect: although auditors serve investors, they are hired by management. To the extent that the interests of investors and management
do not align closely, the relationship is one with inherently high ‘agency costs.’ To reduce these
agency costs, mechanisms must be found to increase auditors’ accountability to investors. The
U.S.’s reliance on litigation may be one such means, but, as later discussed, it does not translate
easily (if at all) to the legal systems of Europe and the U.K. Thus, if a given country does not want
to utilize litigation as its principal means of holding auditors accountable, it must ﬁnd an alternative strategy. This paper will suggest that the tailored use of shareholder voting may offer such an
alternative means to ﬁll this void.
2.

Diagnosis

Initially, this essay will seek to map the most likely explanations for auditor failure and then match
these hypotheses with relevant reforms that logically respond to them. In overview, I will group
the most common explanations for why the auditor is a less effective gatekeeper today under four
headings:
(1) The predominance of consulting income over auditing income inclines the auditor to be
more accommodating in order to use its auditing role as both a loss leader and a portal of
entry into the client in order to maximize more lucrative consulting income;
(2) Reduced competition and the de facto oligopoly enjoyed by the Big Four may invite the
auditor to be less protective of its reputational capital, instead arguably treating it as a
‘wasting asset’; in essence, the auditor may today need less to excel and establish its
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professional superiority at detecting fraud, and more to accommodate issuer management
– at least without becoming caught in a scandal that jeopardizes its reputation for
integrity;
(3) Investors may care less today about audited ﬁnancial information and rely more on other
protections and/or other gatekeepers (including securities analysts, credit rating agencies,
and activist hedge funds); at the same time, the pervasive use of incentive equity compensation as the primary form of executive compensation may cause the executives at issuers
to press ever more aggressively for auditors to defer to their earnings goals; and
(4) In some cases (a minority, to be sure), audit ﬁrms or engagement partners at those ﬁrms
appear to have been complicit in fraud. These cases may represent instances in which
audit ﬁrms, having exhausted their reputational capital through involvement in prior scandals, survive by deferring to management and exercising little or no professional
independence.
The view discussed above that auditing and consulting are incompatible obviously underlies
the CMA’s recent report. Still, this paper is agnostic about the adequacy of this and other explanations for audit failure. Each may be true in part, but none is unanswerable. Nonetheless, a pervasive problem does seem to exist with audit quality. To cite just one statistic, in 2017, the
International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (‘IFIAR’) reported ﬁnding deﬁciencies
in 40% of the audits its members inspected.12 Actually, IFIAR thought this was an encouraging
sign, because it was down from 47% in a comparable 2014 study. Yet, if a hospital review board
found errors in 40% of the surgeries that surgeons working at that hospital had conducted, I doubt
that this board would be encouraged (even if the rate was down from 47% a few years earlier). To
be sure, there is no perfect or common metric here because these percentages depend on how
tough each regulator is and also on how representative are the audits that it inspects. Still, this
statistic gives us a starting point that suggests that auditing errors apparent to a regulator are
common.
My analysis is marginally different from the standard explanation for auditor failure. The standard critique focuses on oligopoly and conﬂicts of interest as its explanation for why the auditor
has underperformed. But it is also possible that the auditor is doing exactly what its corporate
client wants: that is, providing a deferential, even cursory, review of the issuer’s ﬁnancial statements that raises few problems. The deeper problem then is not that competition is limited or that
the desire for more lucrative consulting work creates a conﬂict of interest, but that the client, itself,
does not want aggressive auditing and outsiders (including investors) cannot distinguish superior
from mediocre auditing services. Knowing this, the major auditing ﬁrms (or at least some of them)
may have decided that auditing is a ‘commodity’ business in which one cannot successfully
compete based on the quality of one’s services, but only based on client accommodation and
low cost. The net result is to produce a common focus on cost minimization: how can the
audit ﬁrm maximize its revenue by minimizing its effort and investment?
That is a harsh diagnosis, but it poses an even harder question: what might work to change this
status quo? This article’s answer is that we need to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding the
auditor/ investor relationship.13 Although there may be multiple means to this end, the fact that
the U.K. (and probably Europe as well) are disinclined to rely on a deterrence focused strategy
(which, to be sure, has been far from an unqualiﬁed success in the U.S.) implies that some
other means must be found to change the incentives of audit ﬁrms. Two principal means to
this end will be assessed: (i) giving investors a greater role in the selection and removal of the
auditor, and (ii) introducing a more transparent system under which the audit regulator reviews
the auditor’s performance and publicly communicates its evaluation in much clearer language
than is used today. This would require formally grading the auditor’s work and publicly
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communicating this ‘grade.’ To some degree, this would also require asking the auditor to make
additional judgments that would frankly require it to exercise discretion, but in a manner that investors could understand and evaluate. These two ideas ﬁt together, because it is only when investors
are both authorized and incentivized to select and remove the auditor that auditors will feel the need
to compete based on their quality of services. To make competition produce a race to the top, not the
bottom, requires that the audit regulator grade the auditor and then give shareholders a greater
decision-making role. At that point, auditing would cease to be a ‘commodity business.’
2.1.

The auditing/consulting balance

For decades now, the most popular explanation among reformers for audit failure has been the
claim that the pursuit of lucrative consulting work inclines the auditor to be overly accommodating and deferential to its clients’ managements. But in both the U.S. and Europe, signiﬁcant
restrictions have been imposed on consulting services, leading one to question whether this
factor can still remain the primary explanation for auditing failure. In the U.S., in the wake of
the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals, Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (‘SOX’), which prohibited auditors from providing nine speciﬁed non-audit services to
their audit clients and further required that the provision of other non-audit services to the
audit client had to be speciﬁcally approved by its audit committee.14 More recently, the European
Union followed a functionally similar approach by capping non-audit fees at 70% of the audit fees
for any given client.15 Thus, although the desire to obtain lucrative consulting work from an audit
client could still have some inﬂuence on the auditor, audit fees will always overshadow consulting
income in the case of any individual audit client.
What has been the reaction to these reforms? A study this year by John Pakaluk looked at the
ratio of non-audit fees to audit fees for both the US and EU companies in 2017 (See Pakaluk
2018). Speciﬁcally, he compared the S&P 1500 (which consists of a large-cap 500, a mid-cap
400, and a small-cap 600) to a sample of 1700 European companies, which were included in
some 38 large, mid, and small-cap indices across exchanges in some 21 European countries.
As shown below, in the case of the vast majority of companies in both Europe and the U.S.,
non-audit fees fell well below the 70% European fee cap, with the majority of ﬁrms having
non-audit fees fall in the under 10% range. To be sure, particularly in the U.S. (which has no percentage ceiling), some companies did have non-audit fees over 200% of audit fees, but these cases
were very few, as next shown (Figure 1):
Even in the U.S., which has no percentage ceiling on non-audit fees, the ratio of non-audit fees
to audit fees has remained stable for a decade at around 21% (as Figure 2 shows):16
But this does not end the debate. In recent years, the Big Four have re-entered the consulting
business in a major way – by supplying these services to companies that they do not audit. As
shown below on Figure 3, non-audit activities have risen rapidly since 2006 and, as of 2017, constituted approximately 70% of the total revenues of the Big Four (up from as little as forty percent
after the passage of SOX):17
This ﬁnding has several possible implications. If the consulting side of the Big Four accounts
for at least 70% of the ﬁrm’s revenues, the consulting side will likely dominate in internal governance decisions within these ﬁrms, and the old culture of auditing may be subordinated to the
values and style of the consultants. The public-service watchdog role of the auditing side, with its
commitment to an attitude of ‘professional skepticism,’ may thus be sacriﬁced. From the perspective of the consultants, auditing may be seen as a low margin ‘commodity’ business, which justiﬁes little investment. In effect, auditing is (at least to them) a loss-leader that is best used to
attract clients. Predictably, the younger generation within the ﬁrm will pick up such an attitude
and seek to escape the audit side for the ‘greener pastures’ of consulting as soon as possible.
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Figure 1. Distribution of ﬁscal 2017 non-audit fees as a percentage of audit fees.

Still, the existing empirical evidence is currently thin to weak for any claim that the dominance of consulting revenues at audit ﬁrms today adversely affects audit quality. In a 2017
study, Lisic, Myers, Pawlewicz and Seidel examine the relation between the proportion of consulting revenue received by an auditing ﬁrm and audit quality (See Lisic et al. 2017). They
ﬁnd that, before the passage of SOX, higher proportions of audit ﬁrm consulting revenues ‘negatively impacted both audit quality and investor perceptions of audit quality.’18 Yet, following
SOX, they do not ﬁnd any ‘statistically signiﬁcant association between audit ﬁrm consulting revenues and either audit quality or investor perceptions of audit quality.’19 Of course, post SOX,
most of this consulting income is not coming from audit clients (at least in the typical case).
Consulting income is not the only source of potential conﬂicts that could limit an auditing
ﬁrm’s independence. The U.K.’s CMA has found that two-thirds of the chief ﬁnancial ofﬁcers
in large listed and private companies were alumni of the Big Four (See Carillion Report 2018).

Figure 2. The decline of consulting for audit clients.

546

J.C. Coffee

Figure 3. The resurgence of consulting at auditing ﬁrms.

The implication here is that an individual auditor may seek to accommodate the issuer’s management in the hopes of joining it at a high level.
From a policy perspective, any discussion of possible reforms might begin by asking why do
consultants remain within the audit ﬁrm, when they could simply leave en masse (as Accenture
once exited Arthur Andersen). Presumably, the logical answer is that consultants have not left the
audit ﬁrm because it beneﬁts them to stay within it, probably because of the ﬁrm’s high reputational capital. Put simply, the names of the Big Four are household words, globally recognized
and respected. If the consulting side therefore wishes to remain wedded to the auditing side,
this suggests a reform strategy for capitalizing on this preference, which we will turn to shortly.
2.2. Reduced competition (or the competition in laxity)
It used to be the Big Eight; now, it is the Big Four. The evidence of oligopoly is clear.20 Indeed,
there may be even less competition than the number four suggests, because each of the Big Four
specializes. A global bank may perceive that only one or two ﬁrms in the Big Four has the scale
and expertise to handle its auditing. Also, one or two of the Big Four may already serve that bank
as a high-paid consultant (and would have to surrender that lucrative consulting it if became the
ﬁrm’s auditor). In short, audit ﬁrms that are enjoying lucrative consulting relationships with a
client may not be willing to serve as its auditor (if the client were to decide to replace its
current auditor); thus, competition for the audit position may be very limited.
But this focus on the limited prospect for competition may miss a more important issue: In
what direction does competition move audit ﬁrms? Does it make them more conscientious and
unyielding? Or rather more tolerant and accommodating? If a Big Four ﬁrm is run by salesoriented executives from the consulting side of the ﬁrm, their desire may be to use the audit
business as a loss leader by which to gain a foothold within a large ﬁrm in order to sell consulting
services. Ultimately, the audit ﬁrm could even rationally decide to cease to be the client’s auditor
in order to outﬂank the E.U.’s 70% rule and market more lucrative consulting services in excess of
that limit.
Phrased differently, it is uncertain whether a reputation for toughness and rigor as an auditor is
today more an asset than a liability for the audit ﬁrm. To the extent that the issuer’s management is
chieﬂy compensated through stock and option awards (as later discussed), it has an enormous
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incentive to prefer an auditor that will let it maximize short-term earnings by bending accounting
rules on revenue recognition and other matters.
From this perspective, mandatory rotation of the auditor may not be the optimal reform
because it may increase the opportunities for management to select the most ﬂexible and accommodating of replacement auditors. What is instead critical is who really selects the incoming
auditor – management, independent directors, or the shareholders, themselves. This in turn
frames the question of how to incentivize and induce the audit committee to engage in closer
monitoring (and more frequent replacement).
2.3.

How much do investors rely on the auditor?

Although conventional wisdom assumes that investors rely on the auditor, this cannot easily be
proven because the audit report is required by law in both the U.K. and the U.S. (at least in
the case of public companies). Possibly, sophisticated investors have come in recent years to
rely more on the projections of securities analysts (which are forward-looking and thus more relevant to ﬁrm valuation). Conceivably, if their company seems troubled, investors will place
greater weight on credit-rating agencies or activist hedge funds (which increasingly offer detailed
critiques of the issuer’s business model and solicit support in proxy contests to change the board
and its policies). Investors may give closer attention to these proposals than to the footnotes to the
ﬁnancial statements because these other advisors offer clear choices (and the investors’ votes can
be decisive). In contrast, hints in the audit report that there are problems underlying the ﬁnancial
statements offer no such choices.
The implication here may be that to make the audit report more relevant, it needs to frame
choices. As a means to this end, it could seek to facilitate a dialogue with investors, ﬁrst by addressing some questions that require qualitative, even subjective, responses (‘How does the auditor
rate the company’s internal controls relevant to those of other companies?’). Conceivably, the
auditor could be required to respond publicly to questions framed by the audit committee,
other board members, or possibly even some speciﬁed percentage of the shareholders. We will
return to this theme later.
Alternatively, even if we have no doubts that investors remain very interested in the audit
report, the possibility exists that management has simply become more adamant in recent
years that the auditors must defer to management’s desire to maximize income in the short
term. Such ‘short-termism’ (a popular diagnosis today) seems most likely to be caused by a
major shift in executive compensation that began in the late 1980s. Figure 4 below shows the
sudden acceleration in the median compensation of CEOs and other top ofﬁcers from 1940 to
2000 (See Frydman and Jenter 2010).
Clearly, there is a major inﬂection point in the 1990s. What caused it? Figure 5 below shows
that a shift from cash to equity compensation bears the principal caused responsibility (See
Frydman and Jenter 2010):
As of 2015, Equilar, a consulting ﬁrm specializing in this area, reports that the share of
total CEO compensation deriving from equity was 60% for companies in the S&P 500 (See
Equilar 2016). The implication here is that management will want the auditor to support its
stock price (whereas a cash-compensated management team will feel this need much less
urgently).
2.4.

Principal/agent problems and rogue auditing

Some evidence in recent scandals suggests that the management of audited entities have pressured
the auditor to the point that the individual auditor or the ﬁrm (or both) were complicit in knowing
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Figure 4. Median compensation of CEOs and other top ofﬁcers from 1936 to 2005.

fraud. That is, the auditor or the ﬁrm was not accused of a lack of competence or negligence, but,
more fundamentally, of disloyalty and deceit.
A glaring example arose in South Africa, this year, where KPMG had represented for many
years the Gupta family, a wealthy family with very close connections to South Africa’s government. Essentially, substantial sums (R6.9 million) were diverted from a Gupta-owned ﬁrm,
Linkway Trading, to pay for the wedding of a Gupta family member.21 An auditor aware of
such a diversion cannot plausibly claim that he made a simply negligent mistake, but rather
has been complicit in a blatant fraud. Indeed, in early 2018, South Africa’s Companies and

Figure 5. The shifting structure of CEO compensation.
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Intellectual Property Commission ﬁled criminal charges against KPMG South Africa as a result of
this transaction. Some nine senior executives at KPMG South Africa resigned from the ﬁrm.
Meanwhile, South African companies have begun to sever ties with KPMG (See Doherty 2017).
If this were not trouble enough, KPMG encountered similar problems in South Africa in its
relationship with VBS Mutual Bank, which failed in 2018. An investigation concluded that VBS
was ‘corrupt and rotten to the core’ and recommended that a claim be instituted by the Prudential
Authority against KPMG (See Motau 2018, Marriage October 2018). Even more revealing, the
engagement partner for KPMG on the VBS audit had been lent substantial funds by VBS at
below market rates (and without the knowledge of KPMG).22 This at least sounds like a bribe.
3. Prescription: what might work?
Gatekeeper failure is not a new phenomenon. Following the IPO crash in the U.S. in 2000 and
2001, Congress concluded that both securities analysts and auditors had failed to maintain
their professional independence and took various actions in SOX. In the case of auditors, Congress replaced private self-regulation with public regulation through a new regulator, the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (‘PCAOB’). After the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, the
U.S. Congress turned its attention to credit rating agencies and enacted reforms in the DoddFrank Act of 2010. Today, as ﬁssures seem to be widening in the foundation underlying the gatekeeper model for the auditor, re-thinking of the auditor’s role is again needed. One can no longer
assert with conﬁdence that the auditor acts as a reputational intermediary who pledges its reputational capital to assure investors as to the reliability of the issuer’s ﬁnancial statements. Logical as
that claim may be, it is not proof, and ideas have to be tested.
Viewed objectively, this theory of the auditor as a reputational intermediary could prove to be
overly theoretical and illusory for a variety of reasons, including:
(1) Investors may no longer rely as much on auditors today either because (1) they see auditors as ‘captured’ by the issuer and thus independent in name only, or (2) investors may
care less about historical ﬁnancial data and more about the forward-looking estimates and
projections of the security analyst;
(2) Investors may be unable to distinguish superior auditing from inferior auditing because
the entire process is opaque;
(3) An individual auditing ﬁrm could have exhausted its reputational capital because of
involvement in repeated scandals and survives simply on its low cost, accommodating
approach to auditing; or
(4) Because the market for auditing services for publicly held ﬁrms in the U.K. resembles an
oligopoly, the rational audit ﬁrm may only need to ensure that its reputation does not fall
substantially behind its few rivals; that is it is only a relative decline in reputation, not the
overall strength of its reputation, that matters.
One should be cautious about accepting any one of these possibilities as a general proposition.
The fact that younger and smaller audit ﬁrms have not been able to compete with the Big Four
very successfully suggests that the Big Four still possess substantial reputational capital.
Clients retain the Big Four (and pay higher fees to them) to satisfy investors (who remain skeptical
of less well known ﬁrms). Also, it is clear that when an auditor does become subject to major or
repetitive scandals in a country, some of their clients do back away, suggesting that reputational
capital can be depleted and that scandals do cost the audit ﬁrm clients.23
If one believes that investors have lost conﬁdence in the audit process, one answer may be to
make the process more open and transparent and also more rigorous, in part by ending ‘pass/fail’
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grading in favor of a more thorough evaluation of the issuer’s ﬁnancial position and in part by
using the audit regulator’s own evaluation of the auditor’s performance as a trigger for other sanctions (including mandatory rotation of the audit ﬁrm). If one believes that individual audit partners
have violated their ﬁrm’s own policies out of loyalty to the client, then narrower remedies, such as
mandatory rotation of the audit partner, may be more appropriate.
At present, the FRC does make its audit quality reviews public, but little information is
revealed because the grades are relatively terse.24 Providing a fuller evaluation may encourage
investors to place greater conﬁdence in the integrity of the audit regulator and the auditor.
Still, there is a grimmer possibility that would necessitate more sweeping reforms: audit ﬁrms
may have decided that auditing is a ‘commodity’ business where they cannot compete based on
the quality of their services, because their clients want deference more than professional quality.
To the extent this view is deemed plausible, the only remedy that will work is to give the shareholders a greater role in the selection of the auditor.
3.1.

Comparing audit regulation in the U.S. and Europe

The U.K.’s FRC and the U.S.’s PCAOB are roughly comparable bodies, both responsible for
monitoring the quality of accounts published by public companies and the quality of the audit
of listed companies and other major public entities (‘PIEs’).25 Both are members of the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (‘IFIAR’), an independent and nonproﬁt organization dedicated to enhancing audit oversight globally, which was established in Paris in 2006 by
audit regulators from 18 jurisdictions and which has now grown to have 53 members around the
world.26 European audit regulators and the European audit process are governed by the E.U.’s
Statutory Audit Directive, which was ﬁrst adopted in 2006 and most recently amended in
2014.27 Thus, the FRC is representative of most European audit regulators.
Despite many similarities, the FRC (and, by extension, similar European bodies) differ from
the PCAOB in exercising authority through a number of delegation agreements with ‘recognized
supervisory bodies,’ most notably the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales
(‘ICAEW’), which in turn licenses the majority of audit ﬁrms (including the Big Four) (See
ICAEW Representation 2018). All U.K. audit ﬁrms that audit listed companies are subject to
Audit Quality Review by the FRC. Larger ﬁrms appear to be inspected annually. This process,
common to Europe, essentially parallels the audit review undertaken by the PCAOB.
But there are differences. U.S. public companies must also undergo an annual audit of their
internal controls, and the PCAOB monitors this audit as well. The PCAOB also has broader enforcement powers than the FRC (as the ICAEW, itself, recognized in its 2018 submission to Sir John
Kingman in connection with his continuing review of the FRC).28 Beyond these differences, the
U.S. relies on private enforcement of law to a far greater degree than does the U.K. or any European country.
Whatever the reason, the perception in U.K. (in the FRC’s words) is one of ‘falling trust in
business and the effectiveness of audit.’29 This has led both the FRC and the CMA to propose
a ban on audit ﬁrms earning lucrative consulting fees from issuers that the ﬁrm also audits
(See Collinson 2018). This would effectively supersede the E.U.’s 70% ceiling with a ﬂat prohibition. In the U.S., such a prohibition on consulting applies only to a limited number of statutorily
listed non-audit services (and auditors may have found ways to outﬂank some of these
prohibitions).30
The FRC’s proposal is at least consistent with the limited empirical evidence and does not
seek to ban consulting income that is received from non-audit clients. Of course, some might
argue that such a universal prohibition would encourage greater competition among audit ﬁrms
because today an audit ﬁrm that is a consultant to the issuer may not want to become its
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auditor (as this would require the sacriﬁce of consulting income). But, as noted earlier, there is
little convincing evidence to date that consulting fees from non-audit clients affects audit
quality at audit clients.31
Thus, to sum up the existing differences between the U.S. and the U.K., the PCAOB has
somewhat stronger enforcement authority than the FRC; auditors in the U.S. audit the adequacy of internal controls; and the U.S. legal system permits broad, ‘opt-out’ securities
class actions that can be brought against an auditor, thereby unleashing private enforcement.
In contrast, the U.K. may soon adopt a more prophylactic rule than the U.S., which would
prohibit audit ﬁrms receiving any consulting fees from an audit client. Still, it lacks the enforcement powers of the SEC (in particular, the ability to deal with the issuer’s directors and
management).
3.2.

What else should be considered?

Given that the current evidence suggest that, in both the U.S. and the U.K., most issuers do not use
their auditors as consultants to a signiﬁcant degree,32 the FRC’s proposal to bar auditors from
serving as consultants to audit clients, even if desirable, will not produce any revolutionary
change. Put differently, the point of diminishing returns may have been reached with respect to
restrictions on consulting income. If so, what other changes (which could be complements
rather than alternatives) should then be considered?
(1) Litigation. An obvious possibility would be to authorize U.S.-style securities class actions.
But this is well beyond the scope of the FRC’s authority. Moreover, it would require wrenching
changes in the English legal system, which not only does not authorize an ‘opt-out’ class action,
but forbids contingency fees and imposes a ‘loser pays’ rule requiring fee shifting (both of which
rules are highly inconsistent with a U.S.-style system of private enforcement through class
actions).33 The Bar in the U.K. can be expected to resist any such change vigorously. Thus,
private enforcement as a means by which to hold the auditor accountable is not realistically
within reach at this time.
(2) A Stronger Investor Role in the Selection of the Auditor. Let us start from the realistic premises that (a) management, not the shareholders, actually chooses the auditor, and (b) many managements would prefer a perfunctory audit that does not intrude on or challenge their judgments.
If so, a possible answer is to give shareholders a greater role in the selection of the auditor. One
means to this end would be to allow some percentage of the shareholders to nominate an alternative auditor that a majority of the shareholders could opt for in a proxy contest. Suppose, hypothetically, 10% of the shareholders could make such a nomination by a given date each year. Would
they rush to do so? Under many circumstances, this is unlikely; diversiﬁed shareholders are not
eager to incur costs (particularly to beneﬁt other non-paying shareholders) and will under many
circumstances remain passive.
But this is not always true. Although diversiﬁed shareholders (such as large asset managers
and mutual funds) tend not to become involved in ﬁrm-speciﬁc issues (because their large portfolios make such involvement too costly), they are much more likely to become involved and
active with respect to generic issues that arise across their portfolio. Thus, today, the largest
asset managers and mutual funds in the U.S. (e.g. BlackRock, Inc., State Street Bank and
Trust, and The Vanguard Group) do actively participate in issues involving climate change,
board diversity, or corporate governance, because these are issues that constantly arise (and in
a similar fashion) across their portfolio. Thus, they can formulate general policies at low cost
because they enjoy economies of scale. Choice of the auditor is a similar issue because diversiﬁed
investors can easily acquire sufﬁcient information regarding the limited number of available
auditors.
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Even if it were the case that diversiﬁed investors would remain passive as investors, other
shareholders have a strong preference for activism. In the U.S. today, there are over 100 large
hedge funds whose business model is to specialize in activism. Typically, they search for underperforming companies where they believe a change in management and/or business policies will
yield a short-term shock price increase. Having identiﬁed such a target, they buy a substantial
stake (usually, under 10%), solicit allies to do likewise (thereby assembling what is called a
‘wolf pack’), and then seek board representation. Often, their goal is to force a sale, divestiture
or merger. Their ultimate success depends upon their ability to convince diversiﬁed shareholders
to support them, but at least when they win the support of the major proxy advisors (i.e. Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass Lewis & Co.), they have recently been highly successful.
All the recent evidence shows that activists’ engagements with public companies are accelerating
worldwide.34
Suppose then that the shareholders in a troubled corporation have experienced a signiﬁcant
restatement or other accounting-related crisis. Suppose further that an activist shareholder perceives that seeking to replace the auditor could be a useful tactic in its broader campaign to
obtain board representation for itself and its allies. Suppose ﬁnally that the activist convinces
the major proxy advisors to support it. Now, a low threshold (such as 10%) at which it could
nominate a new auditor presents a real opportunity. Moreover, there is evidence that shareholders
today will vote to oust an auditor who has performed poorly.35
At present, the U.K.’s Companies Act provides for shareholder ratiﬁcation of the board’s or
audit committee’s choice of auditor and gives responsibility to both the board and the shareholders to appoint the auditor under different circumstances, but it says nothing about the shareholders voting to replace the auditor.36 In this light, a provision in a company’s articles of
association authorizing such a replacement by shareholders (based on a speciﬁed nomination procedure) would not seemingly contravene the Companies Act. Even if the Act were read to authorize the board to overrule the shareholders’ choice of auditor, it would be the rare board that
would dare to overrule its own shareholders (particularly if a hedge fund activist was waiting
in the background).
Who could the shareholders ﬁnd as a replacement auditor? It seems unlikely that a Big Four
ﬁrm would agree to challenge a fellow Big Four ﬁrm. To do so would invite counter-challenges at
their own clients. Also, it may be more lucrative to be a consultant to that client, rather than its
auditor. Still, audit ﬁrms outside the Big Four might be more than willing to serve. Indeed, this
might be the one route by which the current oligopoly within the auditing profession could be
loosened.
The key point here is that competition for the favor of investors (rather than management)
seems the one change that could cause audit ﬁrms no longer to see their core business as a ‘commodity’ business. Such competition encourages auditors to invest in their reputation for toughness
and rigor. To be sure, no basic transformation is likely until some shareholder votes do change
auditors. Nonetheless, this is the one reform that could produce a race to the top, rather than
the bottom.
(3) Grading. Today, the FRC (possibly with assistance from the ICAEW) does ‘grade’ auditors in terms of audit quality.37 But what happens to this grade? The issuer’s audit committee may
see and discuss it, but the public learns little from the opaque grades that are currently given. Pass/
fail grading communicates little meaningful information. This frames an opportunity.
What might be done? Multiple goals are attainable here. First, a fuller grade with an explanation from the FRC may cause the audit committee to respond appropriately, or, when disclosed,
the dialogue between the FRC and the audit committee might lead investors to take a greater interest in auditing. Second, release of the grade could be used as an effective sanction, one that could
induce the auditor to upgrade the rigor of its audit, even if in so doing it offended its issuer client.
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If one gives priority to creating an effective sanction, not only should the rule require full disclosure of the grade and the associated evaluation, but one could tie a poor grade (possibly over
multiple years) to a variety of other sanctions. For example, a repetitive low grade could lead to
(1) mandatory rotation of the auditor; (2) mandatory rotation of the audit partner; (3) restitution of
some portion of the audit fee on the grounds that it was not properly earned; or (4) a prophylactic
ban on consulting services by the auditor (both to audit clients and others). Indeed, the ultimate
death sentence might be to tell a deﬁcient auditor that it could not take on new audit clients for a
speciﬁed number of years. The strategy here should be a steadily escalating series of sanctions that
compel the auditor to perform its audit with greater care and diligence. Indeed, the threat of taking
away consulting (even for non-audit clients) should lead the consultants within the audit ﬁrm to
also pressure for a stronger audit for their own protection. To paraphrase Dr. Johnson, knowledge
that consulting will be banned in the event of another low grade ‘focuses the mind wonderfully’ –
like the knowledge that one is to be hanged in a fortnight.
To be sure, even without such options, the FRC could simply take away the auditor’s license.
But in a world of only four large auditors, this arguably might reduce competition undesirably or
even destabilize the market for auditing services. Thus, lesser, but escalating, sanctions might be
easier to impose. The nuance here is that their approach would be known to the audit ﬁrm, thereby
giving it a strong incentive to improve its engagement with a speciﬁc client. To visualize the
difference, imagine that the audit of a particular client has been graded as deﬁcient for two
years in a row. But the auditor’s audit of other clients has been entirely satisfactory. License revocation here would seem overbroad, but a sanction such as mandatory rotation would be more
likely to fall only on the culpable actors. License revocation might still be appropriate in cases
of broad, multi-client failure, but a focus on the speciﬁc auditor/issuer relationship makes
better sense.
(1) Dialogue with the Audit Committee. The auditor may sense (in at least some cases) that the
issuer does not want a robust audit (and is reluctant to pay for one). As a result, even under
pressure from the FRC, the auditor may continue to provide a relatively perfunctory audit.
How can greater pressure be focused on the audit committee? One possible means may lie in
sending the FRC’s annual evaluation of the auditor to the client’s audit committee and, when
this evaluation shows deﬁciencies, asking for a response from the audit committee. In essence,
the question posed would be: What do you intend to do about this?
Today, the FRC lacks authority over directors. But the proposals in the Kingman Review
would change this. The FRC (or its successor) could be given authority to determine whether
directors were sufﬁciently experienced and skilled to be members of the audit committee. How
they responded to inquiries from the FRC could be a major factor in that evaluation.
To be very clear, it is not suggested here that the FRC could disqualify directors from serving
as directors (that would seem to be the prerogative of the shareholders), but it could ﬁnd speciﬁc
directors (or an entire audit committee) to have been inadequate. In such event, it could require the
company to select a new audit committee.
(2) Dialogue with Investors. A more controversial option would be for the FRC to disclose to
the public its full evaluation of the auditor’s report and the audit committee’s response (if any). To
the extent that not all audits are reviewed by the FRC, this approach would lead to the objection
that the audit reports so released were unrepresentative, and thus this might present similarly situated auditors in very different lights. Still, over time, these differences would average out, and
investors would gain valuable information. The hope here is that disclosure of the FRC’s grade
and its fuller evaluation would induce the issuer (and particularly its audit committee) to take
the FRC’s comments seriously and respond to them. The result is to enhance the audit regulator’s
inﬂuence.
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Another predictable objection will be that release of critical comments by the audit regulator
suggesting that the audit was less than adequate will spook the market and thereby injure investors. But this argument cuts both ways. Aware that the regulator’s adverse comments on the audit
report will be released to investors and that such disclosure might affect stock prices, issuers
might place less pressure on auditors to accept dubious accounting positions and recognize the
need for an independent audit. From an ex ante perspective, less accounting irregularities
would result.
(3) Expanding the Auditor’s Role. Many believe the U.K. needs to strengthen the internal controls at U.K. listed companies in the looming shadow of Brexit to assure its continued position as a
ﬁnancial superpower. Others believe that the auditor’s role has been diminished and become perfunctory. Still others focus on the auditor’s expanded role in the U.S. (where the auditor reviews
and evaluates the public company’s internal controls) and believe that the U.K. should follow its
lead (at least to some degree). From any of these perspectives, a case can be made for requiring the
auditor to engage in some type of evaluation of the issuer’s internal controls (although not necessarily a full scale audit).
What would be the impact of such a change? Of course, it would impose additional costs on
issuers (and yield enhanced income for auditors), but recent scandals have suggested failures in
internal controls that may justify such a step. Second, it would enhance the professional status and
standing of the auditor, making it a truer ‘gatekeeper.’ Arguably, investors would rely more on the
auditor, because it was now not just a ‘bean counter,’ but a sophisticated evaluator of risk.
Of course, a reply is foreseeable: if auditors fail at ‘bean counting,’ why would they do better
at evaluating internal controls? Will they not again be passive and deferential (particularly given
that the issuer will be paying them even more)? Several answers are plausible. One answer might
be that if the FRC were to grade the auditor’s performance as deﬁcient at both functions and if the
FRC is prepared to require mandatory rotation after some period of underperformance, the auditor
will face a starker threat (because it now has more at stake), and thus it can less afford to be deferential. Another answer might be that if investors care more, under this expanded regime, about
what the auditor does, they will also care more about who the auditor is (and may place more
pressure on the audit committee regarding the choice of the auditor and rotation). Today, competition among auditors seems a weak force because (a) auditors have little desire to compete, and
(b) investors have little information about auditor performance. In short, as we enhance the status
of the auditor and provide more information about its performance, we also increase investor
interest and capacity to judge.
Finally, given that over 70% of the revenues at auditing ﬁrms comes today from consulting, it
is likely that consultants dominate the ﬁrm’s leadership, and some may see auditing as a low
margin ‘commodity’ business that does not justify signiﬁcant investment. They may ask themselves: why should we expend more assets, time, and effort, looking for minor discrepancies
or debatable judgments, when the client (the issuer) really wants only a quick and deferential
review? Yet, the U.S. experience shows that adding internal controls review made auditing a considerably more proﬁtable business and thus may justify greater efforts to protect the ﬁrm’s reputational capital. This argument works if, and only if, enforcement is also tightened, so that this
enhanced position can be lost.
3.3. What won’t work?
Both the Kingman Report and the CMA have proposed new approaches, but these approaches
may not necessarily respond to the deeper, underlying problem that the client does not want a rigorous, independent audit.38 In that light, let us thus review brieﬂy some of the ideas that have surfaced regularly in the current debate:
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(1) Joint Audits. Advocates of this approach believe it will train smaller audit ﬁrms outside the
Big Four so that they can in time compete and become the auditors for major ﬁrms. But will it
have this impact? It seems equally possible that Big Four ﬁrms will form de facto partnerships
with smaller ﬁrms with the implicit understanding that the smaller ﬁrm will not challenge the
Big Four ﬁrm in the future. All that we know for certain is that France has used joint audits
since the 1960s and that French issuers pay ‘signiﬁcantly more’ for their audits than do U.K.
issuers (See Masters 2018).
The ‘joint audit’ proposal is not demonstrably ill-conceived (because the audit regulator could
eventually insist on the use of the smaller ﬁrm at the time of mandatory rotation), but it does seem
less a reform than a Full-Employment Act for auditors.
(2) Audit Regulator Supervision of Auditor Appointments. This idea is also given considerable prominence in the CMA report, but it is less than clear what it means. If it means that the
audit regulator will select any replacement auditor (such as on a mandatory rotation), that
raises the question of whether they are the better decision-maker than the shareholders. Moreover,
if shareholders are invited to rely on the audit regulator, they may have less incentive to take on
this responsibility themselves.
In all likelihood, the audit regulator will only focus on the possible appointment of a new
auditor at the time of a mandatory rotation. In contrast, the shareholders might decide on any
annual appointment to select a different auditor.
Realistically, bureaucracies do not always remain vigilant. When a new reform is introduced,
they may be attentive and pro-active at ﬁrst, but over time they slip back to a business-as-usual
pace.
Ideally, both the audit regulator and the shareholders should see the choice of the auditor as an
important decision in which they want to be involved. Above all the audit regulator needs to
encourage the shareholders to be active and should not act as a substitute for them.
(3) Mandatory Rotation. Although this is a necessary element in any package of reforms (and
does not yet exist in the U.S.), it is no panacea. The danger, of course, is that if management dominates the process, it may seek the most accommodating and deferential of the various candidates
for the position of replacement auditor. To counter this, the audit regulator should communicate
with the leading institutional shareholders to see if they want a role and a voice in the process
(possibly encouraging interviews of the rival candidates before these shareholders).
4.

Conclusion

To restate the core idea, gatekeepers exist in a principal/agent relationship with the investors who
rely on them. But it is generally management who hires and ﬁres them. This anomaly sets the
stage for this paper’s principal prescription: to reduce high agency costs, gatekeepers need to
be made more accountable to investors by giving the latter a greater role in their selection and
removal. Nonetheless, recent efforts at reform have focused instead more on reducing the conﬂicts
of interest to which gatekeepers are subject. That is useful, but misses the greater need to empower
the true principal to choose. In the past, such reforms were overlooked because shareholders were
assumed to be dispersed, passive and incapable of collective action. With the rise of institutional
investor activism, that is no longer true. This new force needs to be harnessed and put to work.
What then won’t work? Although it may be desirable to deny auditing ﬁrms the ability to
provide consulting services to their audit clients, the likely impact of such a reform at this
point will probably be modest. The point of diminishing returns has been reached in terms of
what restrictions on consulting can accomplish. More is necessary before auditing ﬁrms are
likely to compete in terms of the quality of their audit services. Here, auditors are not
unique.39 Whether the gatekeeper be the auditor, the credit rating agency, or someone else,
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serious reform requires giving investors, as the intended beneﬁciaries of these services, a greater
role in the selection of the gatekeeper. Otherwise, increased competition among auditors could
even be counter-productive. For example, increased competition among credit-rating agencies
in the years before the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis produced serious grade inﬂation, as rating agencies
feared the loss of clients if they did not rate debt offerings very favorably (See Coffee 2011).
Only if the gatekeeper must please investors to remain in ofﬁce will it loyally serve investors,
rather than management.
More generally, sensible reform needs to combine the carrot and the stick. That is, asking the
auditor to evaluate the issuer’s internal controls (perhaps annually, perhaps every two years) offers
a ‘carrot’: auditing ﬁrms increase their revenues (and this justiﬁes increased investment in auditing). Such a change also makes the auditor’s response more observable, giving investors greater
ability to judge the differences among auditors. But offering this carrot only makes sense if other
changes can encourage shareholders to become involved in the selection of the auditor. A low
threshold that would allow 10% of the shareholders to propose an alternative auditor for a shareholder vote would effectively enable one or two activist hedge funds to propose such a replacement. In the U.S., activist funds already are incentivized to undertake corporate governance
contests as part of a broader campaign to secure board representation. In the U.K., such contests
seem possible (and desirable) if governance rules are simpliﬁed. In both countries, proxy advisors
(i.e. Institutional Shareholder Services and Glass-Lewis) could play a decisive role, as diversiﬁed
institutional investors tend to rely on them.
The corresponding ‘stick’ in these proposals would be a tougher grading policy by the FRC,
with new sanctions triggered by sustained low grades. Such a balanced policy might combine the
following elements:
(1) The end of pass/fail grading and the use of an expanded grading scale with multiple
grades that rate the auditor’s performance as excellent, satisfactory, deﬁcient, or
failing, with the latter two grades being accompanied by an explanation;40
(2) Publication of the auditor’s grades on an issuer by issuer basis if the auditor’s performance remained sub-par for a deﬁned period (say, three years);
(3) Mandatory rotation of the auditor for sustained failure (with the same auditor being disqualiﬁed for new appointments as a replacement on another’s auditor’s disciplinary
rotation);
(4) Increased scrutiny and dialogue between the FRC and the audit committee (with the backstop threat of its replacement as well);
(5) Public reprimand as the minimum sanction if the auditor performs poorly on some
number of individual audits; and
(6) A bar on accepting new audit clients (for a deﬁned period) if the ﬁrm receives a deﬁned
number of low grades.
Tougher grading by the FRC (or any successor agency) should serve not simply as a sanction,
but as a catalyst that might lead shareholder activists to propose a new auditor. Unquestionably,
such a policy would impose greater costs on issuers and require substantially increased funding
for the FRC (and its delegates) to enable them to conduct detailed evaluations of auditors. To
justify this greater cost, one can argue that today investors get too little reliable information for
the high fees they indirectly incur for audit services. As for increased funding for the FRC, the
real issue is whether, even if authorized and instructed to be a tough grader, the FRC would
act as one. Grade inﬂation occurs everywhere, not only in academia. Put even more bluntly,
the ‘old boys club’ is a uniquely English institution, and it tends to prefer gentle, private
reprimands.
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Other elements in a fuller policy of accountability are also necessary and would include:
(1) Requiring large, world class audit ﬁrms (both the Big Four and a few others) to accept
responsibility for their sibling ﬁrms in other jurisdictions. That is, if a Big Four ﬁrm
audits a hypothetical issuer (Amalgamated Widgets) and relies on the audit of its operations in Italy by its Italian correspondent ﬁrm, its overall grade should be affected by
that partner ﬁrm’s performance; put differently, major ﬁrms should not be able (at least
for regulatory purposes) to partition themselves into a dozen or more independent
ﬁrms and accept no responsibility for the failure or underperformance of a sibling ﬁrm;
(2) Contingency planning for the failure of a major auditing ﬁrm is essential. If a major ﬁrm
fails (as did Arthur Andersen ﬁfteen years ago), it should not be acceptable for its partners
to switch directly to another Big Four ﬁrm. That would only give us the Big Three and
lessen competition even further. Instead, only smaller ﬁrms should be able to hire the
refugees from such a failure, and this might cause a smaller ﬁrm to grow into a true
competitor.
All these steps may seem small, but there is a unifying theme: The auditor of the future must
be more than a ‘bean counter,’ but rather should evolve into a watchdog of systemic risk. If the
2008 crisis carries any lesson, it is that such a watchdog is needed – in particular at ﬁnancial ﬁrms.
For the future, the role of the auditor is either going to shrink or expand. It could shrink as the
old-fashion bookkeeper becomes increasingly irrelevant as computers gain artiﬁcial intelligence.
Or it could expand, as the auditor takes on new functions. In this light, asking the auditor of the
future to monitor internal controls will, over time, place it in a position of much greater importance where it would sometimes be required to make more discretionary judgments on new
and sensitive questions: Is the issuer’s leverage too high to weather a possible crisis? Does the
structure of its executive compensation invite executives to take excessive risk? These are questions that need to be evaluated – but not with a pass/fail grade. Rather, a fuller and considered
evaluation is needed. Still, to assure accountability, a grading curve needs to be imposed; all auditors cannot receive a grade of A+. Also, the grades would need to be quantiﬁed (say on a one to
ﬁve scale). Such grades would interest investors, permit comparisons among auditors, and encourage recommendations by proxy advisors.
To be sure, some auditors may prefer to avoid such an expanded role and continue to defer to
management, but others, motivated in part by a fear of replacement by shareholders, may seek to
develop a reputation for independence. To the extent that auditors take on such a role, they could
become the critical gatekeeper for the future. But ﬁrst, we need competition in the selection of
auditors to turn a race that today may often be to the bottom into a race to the top.
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‘Agency Costs’ is here used in the standard economic sense as the sum of monitoring and bonding costs
plus the irreducible costs of agent disloyalty that are too costly to eliminate. See Jensen and Meckling
(1976).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act prohibited accounting ﬁrms from providing the following nine consulting
services to audit clients: (i) bookkeeping services related to accounting records or ﬁnancial
statements of the client; (ii) ﬁnancial information systems design and implementation; (iii) appraisal or valuation services; (iv) actuarial services; (v) internal audit outsourcing services; (vi)
management or human resources services; (vii) broker-dealer or investment banking services;
(viii) legal or expert services related to the audit; and (ix) any other services that the board
of the client deemed impermissible. See Section 201 of SOX, which amended Section 10A
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-1) to add a new section (g). Other
non-auditing services were not prohibited but had to be expressly authorized by the corporation’s
board.
In the EU audit reform of 2014, a major provision was the imposition of a cap on fees for permitted
non-auditing services, which was set so that fees for non-audit services could not exceed 70% of the
average of the entity’s audit fees over the prior three years. See Regulation No. 537/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 April 2014 on Speciﬁc Requirements Regarding Statutory
Audit of Public-Interest Entities and Repealing Commission Decision 2005/909/EC, 2014 O.J. (L.
158/77) § 4 (EU); see also European Commission Fact Sheet ‘Reform of the EU Statutory Audit
Market-Frequently Asked Questions,’ dated 13 June 2016.
See Bloomberg Editorial (2018) at p.2.
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See Bloomberg Editorial at p. 3.
See Lisic et al. (2017) at p.30.
See Lisic et al. (2017) at p.1.
In the U.K., the Big Four audit 97% of the FTSE 350, and each of the 41 FTSE 100 companies that
changed auditors since 2013 selected one of the Big Four as the replacement auditor. See Marriage
(December 2018).
Leaked emails showed that KPMG’s South African Ofﬁce had approved the payment by Linkway
Trading of the wedding expenses as a business expense of Linkway Trading. See Skoulding (2018),
Cotteril and Marriage (2017).
See Motau (2018) at Paragraph 23.9.
See Notes 30–33.
See www.frc.org.uk/auditors/audit-quality-review/audit-ﬁrm-speciﬁc-reports. For example, a grade
stating ‘limited improvement required’ (which is one of the standard grades) tells investors little.
Unless it states what speciﬁcally should be improved, it is opaque. For the existing grades, see Note 55.
For an overview of the FCA, see ‘The FRC and Its Regulatory Approach’ (FRC Publication dated
January 2014). See also https://www.frc.org.uk/auditors/professional-oversight/oversight-of-audit/
respective-roles-of-government,-the-frc-and the-ac. The biggest difference is that the FRC was not
created by legislation and does not have statutory powers. This seems to be the leading reason that
the Kingman Review has suggested that it be replaced.
For an overview, see IFIAR, Shaping the Future of Audit Regulation: Annual Report 2017. Among its
members in addition to the FRC and PCAOB are the audit regulators of France (Haut Conseil du Commissariat aux Comptes (HBC)), Germany (Auditory Oversight Body (AOB)), Japan (Certiﬁed Public
Accountants & Auditing Oversight Board/Financial Services Agency (CPAAOB/FSA)), and the Netherlands (Autoriteit Financiale Markten (AFM)).
The Statutory Audit Directive (2006/43/EC) was ratiﬁed by the EU Parliament and EU Council in
2006 and was required to be implemented by EU member states by June, 2008. Following the
2008 ﬁnancial crisis, it was further amended in 2014 by Directive 2014/56/EU, which ‘sets the
framework for all statutory audits, strengthens public oversight of the audit profession and
improves cooperation between competent authorities in the EU.’ See European Commission,
‘Auditing of companies ﬁnancial statements,’ https://ec.europe.eu/info/business-economy-euro/
company-reporting-and-auditing/auditing-companies-ﬁnancial-statements_en. Of special relevance
to our topic, Article 32 of the Statutory Audit Directive (as amended) requires each Member
State to have a competent public authority which has the ultimate authority for the approval
and registration of statutory auditors and audit ﬁrms and their oversight. Article 32 also permits
Member States to delegate or allow their regulatory authority to delegate any of their tasks to
other bodies (such as the ICAEW).
See ICAEW Representation (2018) at p. 5.
On 8 October 2018, the FRC proposed a series of reforms to address the ‘underlying falling trust in
business and the effectiveness of audit.’ See https://www.frc.org.uk/news/october-2018/frc-sets-outnew-strategic-focus-to-ensure-audits-s.
For the nine prohibited categories of non-audit services, see Note 17. According to the Pakaluk survey,
some ﬁrms in both the U.S. and the U.K. do pay auditors fees for non-audit services that exceed 70%,
and even 100%, of their audit fees, but these are few. See Note 19.
See Note 22.
See Note 19–20.
Contingent fees are allowed (and common) in the U.S., and, although fees may be shifted against one
side, if the court ﬁnds that it has misbehaved, such fee-shifting is unusual in the U.S., which favors a
rule under which each side bears its own legal expenses. See Alyeska Pipeline Service
Co. v. Wilderness Society (1975) (explaining the ‘American Rule’ on fees).
As of 21 December 2018, a record 284 companies around the world with market capitalizations of
more than $500 million were subjected to activist engagements in 2018, up from 252 in all of
2018. 148 of these engagements were of non-U.S. companies. In total, these campaigns won a
record 194 board seats for insurgents in 2018 (as of 21 December 2018), which was a 42% increase
over 2017. See Lombardo (2018). For a wider-angled overview of their strategy and its impact, see
Coffee and Palia (2016). The relevant point here is that hedge fund activists wish to present themselves
as the champion of the shareholders, and seeking to replace a long-time and poorly graded auditor
would provide them exactly the opportunity they are seeking.
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For example, in May 2018, the shareholders of SIG plc, a distressed U.K. construction products
company whose ﬁnancial statements and audits had been questioned, declined to re-appoint Deloitte
as its auditor. See Kapoor (2018).
Section 489 of the Companies Act 2006 says two things about the appointment of the auditor at a
public company: First, under Section 489(3), the directors may appoint the auditor at any time
before the company’s ﬁrst accounts meeting and may ‘ﬁll a casual vacancy in the ofﬁce of auditor.’
Second, under Section 489(4), the members may appoint the auditor by ordinary resolution ‘at an
accounts meeting’ or where the directors have failed to make the appointment otherwise. Thus, the
company’s articles of association might provide that, absent emergency circumstances, the auditor
should be appointed by the shareholders at the accounts meeting.
Under the U.K. Corporate Governance Code (April 2016), which was prepared by the FRC, ‘[t]he
audit committee should have primary responsibility for making a recommendation on the appointment,
reappointment and removal of the external auditors.’ (Section C. 3.7). Yet, even if the audit committee
must make a recommendation, this does not imply that the shareholders or the board must accept their
recommendation. Moreover, given that the FRC has adopted the U.K. Corporate Governance Code, it
could modify it at least to the point of advising the audit committee to consider seriously any nomination made by a shareholder group (using again a 10% shareholder petition to nominate a candidate).
See Note 40 infra.
No criticism is here implied of the Kingman Review’s call for a more independent audit regulator with
greater powers and guaranteed funding. That is, of course, critical.
The position of the credit rating agency is closely analogous to that of the auditor. During the
period leading up to the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, promoters and underwriters seeking to sell risky
debt securitizations of residential mortgages to investors could play the then three principal
credit rating agencies off against each other in order to obtain inﬂated ratings from them. Although
the position of the auditor is different in important respects, the Big Four constitute a similar
oligopoly.
I understand that the existing grading system rates auditors as (i) good, (ii) limited improvement
required, (iii) improvement required, and (iv) signiﬁcant improvement required. This is less than
ideal and clearly needs a supplemental explanation.
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